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The Virtualization of Citizenship

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Abstract
This article illustrates the difference between formal citizenship and moral citizenship, and traces the shift in focus from formal to moral citizenship in Dutch national and local policy. The mixing of 'citizenship' with 'integration' has given rise to what can be termed a virtualization of citizenship. When 'integration' becomes 'citizenship', the citizenship status of those persons that are formal citizens but supposedly lack 'integration' both shifts from an actual to a virtual possession, and also becomes defined as a 'virtue'. The moralization of citizenship is largely state-initiated and is accompanied by a neoliberal focus on 'individual responsibility'. Thus the state, whose position is endangered in times of globalization, finds a new functional potential in securing the in- and exclusion of 'society' through the pronunciation of moral citizenship in paternalist policies.

Keywords
citizenship, immigration policies, integration, naturalization policy, state

Introduction: Real and Unreal Citizens

Right opposite the Dutch chambers of parliament there is a Burger King with a huge billboard on its outer wall, directly facing parliament. It reads: 'Only a GRILLED burger is a REAL burger'. That would not be much of an opening of this article were it not for the fact that the Dutch word for 'citizen' is 'burger', effectively rendering the billboard text: 'Only a GRILLED citizen is a REAL citizen.' [1] Despite obvious dissimilarities, the Burger King and parliament have one thing in common: they distinguish between 'real burgers' and lesser ('unreal'?) 'burgers'. In the case of parliament, the distinction is made between 'active citizens' and citizens for which no distinct term is used, but which are effectively seen as citizens-*manqué*s. For a couple of decades now, 'citizenship' has been of renewed interest for social scientists and political philosophers (cf. Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Schinkel 2007b; Shafir 1998; Van Gunsteren 1998). The reason for this academic popularity

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of the notion of citizenship is often seen to emerge from the process of globalization (cf. Brubaker 1989; Hall 2002; Van Gunsteren 1998). But the thematization of citizenship in national and local policy illustrates that globalization is perhaps better described as a form of 'glocalization' (Robertson 1995). In this article, I offer a perspective linking the international attention to issues of citizenship and globalization with the Dutch national and local policy-attention to citizenship. I illustrate how the notion of citizenship newly arose as a key policy concept in the last 15 years, how it connected with a discourse on 'integration', and how this led to what I call a *virtualization of citizenship*. This entails a discursive suspending of formal citizenship through a problematization of moral citizenship, which turns citizenship into a possibility instead of an actuality, and which turns it into a virtue. This way citizenship, which is increasingly problematic as a mechanism of in- and exclusion of the nation-state, becomes a state-controlled mechanism of in- and exclusion of society. Citizenship becomes a way of defining 'society' over against a realm discursively constructed as 'outside society', consisting of non-active or inactive citizens and non-citizens lacking proper 'integration' – which is termed as cultural adjustment through 'active citizenship'.

First, in the next section, I discuss the problematization of the modern state/society differentiation in times of globalization, which puts citizenship in its post-war Marshallian form under pressure. Then I discuss the difference between *formal citizenship* and *moral citizenship*, and the relative shift in policy focus towards the latter. I illustrate how that shift amounts to a virtualization of citizenship both in national and in local citizenship policies. While modern citizenship was first and foremost a mechanism of in- and exclusion in the nation-state, the state now takes upon itself the task to regulate the in- and exclusion of society by means of an increasing and one-sided moralization of citizenship in the case of persons who supposedly lack 'integration'.

State/Society Differentiation and the Role of Citizenship

Citizenship traditionally is a mechanism of in- and exclusion of states (Aristotle 1941; Brubaker 1992; Halfmann 1998; Thucydides 1954). Citizenship in that sense is the modern, democratic form of political membership. As in the by now classic notion of T.H. Marshall (1963; cf. Matheson 1897), it concerns a juridically described set of rights and duties, and the citizen can be regarded as a bundle of such rights and duties. By regulating entrance to the state, citizenship at once secured the borders of the nation. As the modern state/society differentiation, given the 'regionalized' notion of society (Luhmann 2005) entailed a relative overlap between 'society' and the nation, citizenship automatically meant inclusion in society. This relative overlap between nation and society was possible only for a brief time in which society, which had been differentiated from the state (cf. Koselleck 1959), formed an ethnically relatively homogeneous whole. The state thus guarded the territorial borders of society. Precisely such a 'regionalized' notion of society loses credibility in times of globalization (cf. Luhmann 2005; Schinkel 2008). By 'society', I here denote a discursive construct which is hegemonic in that it occupies an 'empty' space

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and turns it into the essence of the social collectivity (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 'Society' is therefore a discursive construct, which is strategic in its in- and exclusion. It is crucial that subjects participating in the economy or other spheres can yet be said to remain 'outside society', as discourse on 'integration' (discussed below) illustrates. The difference between membership of the nation-state and membership of society is precisely the fact that the latter is non-codified and discursive in nature (compare: Bauman 2002; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Schinkel 2007a).

For a brief ('Marshallian') period in the 20th century, citizenship sufficed as a guarantor of membership of both nation-state and the discursive domain of society, but in an age in which flows of migration have become permanent, that is no longer plausible. In post-war Europe, political membership meant, in practice, membership of society only for those who were connected by birth to nation and state, and thereby to society (Jacobson 1996: 14–15). In what he calls 'ideal theory', such a model is present for instance in the work of John Rawls: 'a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system … we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life' (Rawls 1993: 41). In social science, Franz Boas has analogously remarked that 'fundamentally, the nation must be considered a closed society … The differentiation between citizen and alien is not so intense as in the closed primitive horde, but it exists.' (Boas 1928: 98) Such a vision of nation-state and society is no longer unproblematic (cf. Bauman 2002; Beck 2002; Sassen 2006; Schinkel 2008; Urry 2000). Of course, there were always excommunications of certain groups, and the membership of society of the poor has been problematized many times. Yet crucial in today's situation in western Europe is that it is the ethnic heterogeneity of society which leads to discursive excommunications explicitly thematizing the problematic citizenship of immigrants and their children. The moment society is entered by people not tied through nativity to the nation, the nation can no longer be seen to overlap relatively with society. While the nation-state is, in Giorgio Agamben's formulation, 'a State that makes nativity or birth (*nascita*) (that is, naked human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty' (Agamben 1996: 162), such a state is in need of new sources of sovereignty, of a new functional potential, when its nation no longer overlaps with the society from which it is differentiated. When persons of different socialization gain political membership, a rift occurs in the seamless overlap between state and nation, and thereby between state and society. That is to say that the modern state/society differentiation that kept both apart at a controlled distance has lost strength. This urges analyses of citizenship and the nation-state to move beyond 'methodological nationalism' (Smith 1983: 26). The fact that the concept of citizenship nonetheless enjoys widespread popularity within the state is related to the shifted position of the state relative to society that is characteristic of globalization. In what can be called a relative shift in discursive importance from formal to moral citizenship, a reorientation of the state vis-a-vis society takes place, which has consequences for the contemporary role of the state. In order to clarify this point, I first discuss the distinction between formal and moral citizenship and then move on to the relative shift in Dutch policy from the former to the latter.

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Formal and Moral Citizenship

Since ancient times, citizenship has been regarded as having reference to inclusion in a state. At least as old is a moralization of citizenship according to which the *real citizen* is an *active citizen*. This is evident in the oldest known thematization of citizenship, namely Perciles's funeral oratory. As Thucydides recounts, 'We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.' (Thucydides 1954: 119) The same goes for Aristotle, for whom the good citizen is someone actively participating in political affairs (1941: 1275a–77b). For the Greek political philosophers, citizenship is an *ethos*. For Romans such as Cicero it becomes a *virtus*. Such approaches, which complement a formal aspect of citizenship with a moral aspect, continue to exist throughout the history of political thought, and they still influence thought on citizenship (cf. Bosniak 2006: 19). With the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, in which 'man' is separated from 'citizen' (see, for the consequences of this, Agamben 1996), a distinction between 'active' (*citoyen*) and 'passive' (*homme*) is repeated (Schinkel 2007b). Robespierre indeed regarded citizenship a 'public virtue' (Dunn 2005: 117). Thus, a distinction is in order between *formal* citizenship – by which I here refer to juridically codified rights and duties of citizen-members of states – and *moral* citizenship – which I take to mean a counterfactual ideal of citizen-participation (cf. Habermas 1998; Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353). Formal citizenship has reference to both juridical status as membership of a juridico-political order and to social rights. I thus subsume under 'formal citizenship' also that which has been called 'social citizenship' and which refers to certain social rights (see Fraser and Gordon 1998; Marshall 1963), as well as 'civic citizenship'; compare a similar categorization under 'state citizenship' (Stewart 1995). By moral citizenship I denote something quite different which entails an *extra-legal normative concept* of the good citizen. It is not merely a factual and descriptive but also a counterfactual and prescriptive notion. Nonetheless, every formal conception of citizenship is bound to entail an aspect of moral citizenship. The distinction is thus analytical and serves the analysis of relative weight given to formal or moral aspects of citizenship. One might be tempted to construe liberal citizenship as promoting formal citizenship and communitarian and republican citizenship as moral citizenship (cf. Van Gunsteren 1998). But these conceptions of citizenship have formal as well as moral aspects. 'Moral citizenship', in my use of the term here, thus denotes not a substantive theory of citizenship but aspects of various approaches to it which are given more relative weight in communitarian theories of citizenship (Putnam 1993; Walzer 1994) than in liberal ones. The formal/moral distinction I propose (with Habermas 1998) has reference not to theoretical or practical notions of citizenship but to aspects of both theory and practice.

The notion of 'active citizenship' as political participation was thematized in the last century as 'political education' in the 1920s and 1930s (Merriam 1931) and as 'political socialization' in the 1950s and 1960s. Such a notion still has widespread currency in the Netherlands (Balibar 1988; Van Gunsteren 1998; Van Gunsteren and Andeweg 1994). This is not what primarily concerns me here. I focus instead on the more recent moralization of citizenship in which citizenship has been incorporated in policies of immigrant integration

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(cf. Schinkel 2007a). That means I critically analyse the substance given in Dutch national and local citizenship policy discourse to the moral aspect of citizenship.

From Formal to Moral Citizenship: The Virtualization of Citizenship in Dutch Policies of Integration

'Integration' becomes 'Citizenship'

The current phase in Dutch integration policy can be called a *culturist* phase (Schinkel 2007a), in which 'cultural integration' takes precedence over 'socio-economic integration'. Under the influence of right-wing politicians such as conservative leader (and later EU Commissioner) Bolkestein, a highly mediatized *National Minorities Debate* was initiated in 1991. Later supported by quasi-scientific essays such as Paul Scheffer's *The Multicultural Drama* (which appeared in the prestigious quality newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* in 2000, see http://www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html), the theme of 'culture' thus entered into the debate on integration. This was accelerated by the swift rise of the populist maverick politician Pim Fortuyn. The 'Fortuyn-revolution' had its main impact on the field of policies of integration. After a brief conservative and populist cabinet, under the aegis of conservative minister Verdonk a harsher policy of integration was initiated which aimed (paradoxically) mainly at the control of immigration and which discursively emphasized the cultural assimilation of immigrants in the Netherlands (Driouichi 2007; Schinkel 2007a). Further spawned by the many public and political interventions of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, member of parliament for the Dutch liberal party – that is, the conservative party – debate centred on issues of cultural integration such as the wearing of the head scarf and other gender issues such as forced marriages (cf. Ghorashi 2003). Debate on integration thus narrowed down to cultural issues and, more specifically, to issues relating mainly to 'Islam' (see Schinkel 2007a). This phase in integration discourse, which continues up to today, can be termed *culturist* to the extent that it is permeated by a culturalized form of racism, which some have termed 'neo-racism' (Balibar 1991; Barker 1981) or 'cultural racism' (Foner 2005; Modood 1997). As Schinkel (2007a) has argued, however, culturism can best be regarded as a 'discourse of alterity' (Castoriadis 1997) that is an equivalent to racism and amounts to the normative observation based on a supposedly cultural distinction, instead of a natural one, as in the case of racism. Culturism problematizes 'cultures' as such for their lack of adjustment to 'Culture' (cf. Eagleton 2000: 53), dubbed 'the dominant Dutch culture'.

At the start of this phase in integration discourse and the accompanying policy, 'citizenship' becomes, according to parliament, 'the leading principle for the new vision on the presence of persons from diverse cultures in the Netherlands' (Tweede Kamer [the Dutch Second Chamber of Parliament], quoted in Driouichi 2007: 25). Citizenship thereby becomes a 'choice' for 'participation in Dutch society' (cited in Driouichi 2007: 26). What comes to the fore with the thematization of citizenship in integration discourse is, on the one hand, a culture-centred way of thinking – practices exemplifying the 'active citizen' are practices

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normalized according to 'the dominant culture' – and on the other hand a loyalty-centred way of thinking – the 'good citizen has "loyalty" towards "society"' (Vermeulen 2007: 54). Citizenship becomes a matter of inclusion in 'society' and it becomes a thoroughly cultural matter (Bjornson 2007; Van Huis and De Regt 2005). This became especially succinct in the 2007 discussion in parliament on double nationalities, in which the double passports of two secretaries of state (one Dutch-Moroccan and the other Dutch-Turkish) were problematized as 'lack of loyalty' to the Netherlands. Loyalties started to dominate the political debate on integration and citizenship around 1992–3, and the cabinet took up a position deemed 'from the 19th century' a few years ealier (Driouichi 2007: 124). The *equalization* between 'integration' and 'citizenship', or rather the definition of 'integration' as 'citizenship', dates back to 1994. Citizenship became the central focus of policies of integration, see *Beleidsopvolging Minderhedendebat: Advies in opdracht van de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken* – Home Office Policy Advice Minority Debate (Van der Zwan and Entzinger 1994). Politically, the equalization between integration and citizenship was promoted in the conservative party (for instance in the VVD paper *Beleidsnotitie van niet-westerse migranten in Nederland – Policy Paper on Non-Western Immigrants in the Netherlands* (VVD 1994), which states: 'the integrated immigrant has become a *citizen*, in the widest possible sense of the word. Thus regarded, "integration" equals the classical notion of "citizenship".' (VVD 1994: 4) The agenda-setting cabinet paper *Contourennota Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden – Memorandum on Integration Policy Ethnic Minorities*) (Home Office 1994) reads: 'The primary goal of integration policy is … the realization of the activating citizenship of persons from ethnic minority groups.' (Home Office 1994: 19) In a letter from the minister of Alien Affairs and Integration in 2003, and in the *Miljoenennota* (*Cabinet Budget Paper*) from 2004, the equalization between 'citizenship' and 'integration' appears complete and both are put on a par. In 2003, 'integration' is defined as 'shared citizenship' (CBS and WODC 2006: 1). In 2004, it is described as 'shared citizenship of minorities and allochthones' (Cabinet Budget Paper 2004: 178). The state sponsored 'measurement' of 'integration' starts from a similar premise in 2006: 'Integration can be regarded as a process of acquiring citizenship and participating in society by allochthones in three societal domains.' (CBS and WODC 2006: 3) Likewise, analyses with more distance to policy put 'citizenship regimes' on a par with 'integration regimes' (cf. Koopmans and Statham 2001).

The recent Cabinet paper on integration, *Integratienota 2007–2011* (*Integration Memorandum 2007–2011*) (VROM 2007), which was drafted by a new and relatively left-wing minister, has been perceived as a break with the xenophobia and harshness of recent years, but, illustrating the fundamental nature of the shifted discursive parameters of Dutch policy discourse, it brought twofold continuity:

1) 'citizenship' remains the dominant accent of the government's integration policy;
2) a neoliberal thematization of 'individual' or 'own responsibility', which came up during the culturist phase of integration discourse, remains.

The paper for instance says, in a paragraph entitled 'Active citizenship is now needed', on its goals: 'societal emancipation and social integration, and within these a strong accent

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on citizenship' (VROM 2007: 7). The *Integration Memorandum*'s subtitle, *Make Sure You're a Part of It!* (*Zorg dat je erbij hoort!*), stresses the importance attached to 'individual responsibility'. Thus, the government makes 'an appeal to all citizens to participate in society on the basis of mutual acceptance and equality' (VROM 2007: 6). That of course presupposes the possibility to *not* take part in society. Consequently, 'bridging function' is expected of citizenship (VROM 2007: 6; compare 'bridging social capital': Putnam 2000). But because citizenship is mostly a case of individual responsibility (such as 'raising your children well' or 'making sure you're a part of it'), the bridging effort is placed solely on the side of those citizens whose citizenship is in need of improvement (Schinkel 2007a).

The Virtualization of Citizenship

The effects of the two processes mentioned above – the increased emphasis on 'culture' and the increasing emphasis on 'citizenship' are twofold:

1) citizenship is increasingly framed as moral citizenship;
2) citizenship is being *virtualized*.

The first means that the emphasis on citizenship focuses mainly on the moral aspect of citizenship. The second means that citizenship thereby becomes, instead of an *actuality* (a juridical status), a *virtuality* (a possible but absent actuality in diffuse and shifting moral terms). I exploit the syntax of 'virtual' to indicate at the same time that citizenship has increasingly become a *virtus*, a virtue as in the Roman humanist notion of citizenship. The 'messier' and more diffuse concept of moral citizenship blurs the formal side of citizenship through the discursive framing of the idea that one is only a *real* citizen when one is an *active* citizen. The equalization between 'integration' and 'citizenship' entails a *virtualization of citizenship* to the extent that the citizenship of those who are citizens in the formal sense but are construed as insufficiently integrated is reduced *from actuality to virtuality*. Not all Dutch 'migrants' and therefore not all those who are the object of assessments of 'integration' are in possession of the formal citizenship status. There is for instance a difference between the juridical statuses of 'citizenship' and 'denizenship' (Hammar 1990) among migrants (see Snel and Engbersen 1999: 276). What is crucial, however, is that such notions refer to inclusion in the nation-state, while 'integration' refers primarily to inclusion in 'society' (Schinkel 2007a). There is, in the Netherlands, a significant number of people who are formal citizens but who are at the same time the object of problematizations of 'integration'. Since 'integration' equals 'citizenship', and more specifically with a heavy emphasis on the moral aspects thereof, the citizenship of this group is downplayed, in effect virtualized, and they are thus discursively disenfranchised.

Of course the emphasis on moral citizenship can lead to juridical codification into aspects of formal citizenship (cf. Vermeulen 2007). While as such, the moralization of citizenship would only gain a juridical codification, what mostly happens up to the present is that the *discourse* on citizenship runs into its own limitations and formulates forms of

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unenforceable force. In parliament, it was noted in 2005 that, beyond formal and juridically codified demands, nothing could be demanded from migrants: 'We must accept the fact that there are limits to what we can enforce in the name of shared citizenship' (MP Rouvoet, cited in Driouichi, 2007: 37). Yet the limits to formal demands at once define the terrain of a culturist discursive force which poses unenforceable demands. These limits in fact mark the border between state and society. The traversing of these limits by integration-cum-citizenship policies illustrates the moralization of citizenship as a diffuse hybrid between the state's force and the government's ideology on civic behaviour. It is precisely the power of the state vis-a-vis the citizen whose moral citizenship is problematized that shapes the virtualization of citizenship as a form of unenforceable force. This becomes apparent in the reversal of the trajectory which immigrants in the Netherlands follow. Before the culturist phase in policies of integration it was assumed that once the immigrant had become a citizen in the formal sense (s)he would in time commit himself or herself to society and become a citizen in the moral sense as well. Currently, however, it is the other way round. As one Dutch legal scholar has noted, it is now predominantly assumed that the migrant is first to become a citizen in the moral sense and to integrate into society before he or she can become a citizen in the formal sense. In that sense, the immigrant now has to *earn* permanent residence and nationality by proving his or her acceptance of the fundamental norms of Dutch society (Vermeulen 2007: 101). A double process thus takes place. On the one hand, newly arrived immigrants are required to first gain moral citizenship in order to apply for formal citizenship status as the crowning achievement of their 'becoming-citizen' (*inburgering*). On the other hand, many who have formal citizenship status but who purportedly lack 'integration' as a consequence of their lack of 'cultural adjustment' are construed as only halfway there. For them, formal citizenship status is indeed a purely formal thing, and in their case the loyalties involved in moral citizenship are the real prize.

It is precisely the fact that moral citizenship is not codified but rather diffuse which makes moral citizenship a strategic mechanism for in- and exclusion of society. It remains discursive and eventually unenforceable, but the difference between membership of the nation-state and membership of society is precisely the fact that the latter is non-codified and discursive in nature (cf. Bauman 2002; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Schinkel 2007a). Moreover, the paradox of unenforceable force can be solved by the invention of extra-legal policy practices such as the Rotterdam 'Intervention Teams' who visit homes without the proper legal warrant in areas designated through special directive as 'Hotspot Zones' (see Van den Berg 2008). Such 'policy experiments' framed as 'exceptional measures' and as 'administrative innovation' are hailed by politicians and policy makers alike precisely because of the fact that they precede possible legal codification.

The Discursive Markers of 'Non-Active Citizenship'

Discursively, the differentiation between 'active' and 'non-active' citizens is facilitated by a terminological differentiation between 'Dutch natives' and all other forms of ethnicity. Just preceding the culturist phase in Dutch policies of integration the 1989 report *Allochthones Policy* was published by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR; the

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official state think tank in the Netherlands). The WRR advised against the use of the notion 'ethnic minority', which had been central in the second phase of integration policy (known then as 'minorities policy'). They suggested replacing what they held to be a stigmatizing concept by 'allochthones' (cf. Geschiere and Jackson 2006). These were contrasted with 'autochthones', denoting native Dutch. The effect of this highly successful terminological intervention was the creation of a totalizing opposition. Whereas 'minorities' was formerly not opposed to 'majority', now an opposition existed between 'allochthones' (lumping all 'ethnicites' together) and 'autochthones' (literally meaning 'of this soil', which is curious given Dutch *jus sanguinis*). This opposition soon made its way into policy. More specifically, a differentiation is made between 'Western' and 'non-Western allochthones'. The latter category consists, among others, of EU nationals and US nationals, but also of Japanese and Indonesians. With the exception of Indonesians (related to the Dutch colonial past), the category 'non-Western' in effect means 'non-poor'.

On the other hand, what is dubbed as 'non-Western' is a specifically cultural selection. Certain 'ethnicities' are constructed as 'non-Western' and, in the culturist phase in the integration discourse, as intrinsically problematic. While 'ethnic minorities' are no longer addressed as such in what some have called a 'post-multiculturalism discourse' (Uitermark et al. 2005), it can be argued that 'ethnicity' is selectively articulated in the discourse of citizenship policies. It is not so much the fear of 'multicultural reification' that puts policy makers off addressing such categories as groups, but rather the circumventing of the paradoxical possibilities of empowerment that such addressing involves, which Michel Foucault has termed the 'tactical polyvalence of discourse': the categories imposed on subjects at the same time enable their emancipation (Foucault 1976). This was the idea behind the policies of the 1980s. Current discourse radically departs from what is a posteriori constructed as 'multiculturalism' in a 'new realism' (Van Meeteren 2005), which sees things as they really are and is not hampered by 'political correctness' and which thus takes the rhetorical shape of a *multiculturealism* (Schinkel 2007a). So while 'ethnic minorities' and their quasi-official spokespersons (which indeed only had the effect of legitimating policies) are no longer the addressee of policies, 'ethnicity' is all over the place, and again not in an anthropological sense of a constructed and 'owned' identity (cf. Baumann 1996), but in a reified sense. The *Integration Memorandum 2007–2011: Make Sure You're a Part of It!* (VROM 2007) signals the fact that 'people withdraw in their own ethnic circle or their religious faith, and live so to speak with their backs to society' (2007: 12). Likewise, when 'crime' is thematized in the memorandum it is in association with fundamentalism, radicalism, non-Western 'allochthones' or minorities, or sometimes mentioning 'Antillians' and 'Moroccans'. Given their 'overrepresentation' in crime figures, ethnically specific policies are initiated (VROM 2007: 24). The problems are deemed most severe among 'Moroccans' (who are mentioned 122 times in the 106-page memorandum).

Thus, when citizenship is thematized, this happens, upon superficial glance, in a general sense, referring to all citizens – thereby meaning all citizens in the formal sense. Yet an 'ethnic' emphasis on 'allochthones' is ever present and thereby the emphasis shifts toward 'citizens in the *moral* sense'. The generality of tone remains but at the same time the focus is on specific persons. The *Integration Memorandum 2007–2011* (VROM 2007) again illustrates this. The government 'focuses in its citizenship policy on all citizens of our

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country. It addresses people not on the basis of their being different but on their active participation in and shared responsibility for society.' (VROM 2007: 98) Nonetheless, throughout policy papers such as this *Integration Memorandum*, it becomes clear that the crucial difference lies between 'autochthones' and '(non-Western) allochthones' and their relative degrees of 'active participation':

> Just as is expected from autochthones, allochthones are expected to do their best to conquer [sic] a place in society by learning the language, having and finishing education, gain income and take responsibility in raising their children. It is also about curiosity with respect to the ways of Dutch society and the life-world of [autochthonous] co-citizens, especially where Dutch culture and history are concerned. By participating in society it becomes possible to increasingly identify with these. (VROM 2007: 98)

It is thus the 'allochthonous' population in the Netherlands which is the primary addressee of policy texts on active citizenship. Hence the formulation above: 'just as is expected from autochthones'. At the same time, a paragraph is devoted to 'radicalization', by which only a turn towards Islamic fundamentalism is denoted. The subtext of such policy statements is a culturist discourse of integration as cultural assimilation. The one-sided thematization of the marker 'ethnic' thus has the effect of a 'dispensation of ethnicity' for native Dutch 'autochthones', in which 'Dutchness' becomes a neutral category, which is all the more plausible given its 'whiteness' and its allegiance to a universalist 'culture' of the Enlightenment (Schinkel 2007a). All that is 'ethnic' is possibly intrinsically problematic and is lumped together under the marker 'allochthones'.

'Active citizenship' now appears as the panacea for the two problems addressed by the *Integration Memorandum 2007–2011*: the fact that 'autochthones' experience fear of Muslims, and the fact that 'allochthones' feel unaccepted.[2] Active citizenship as a form of cultural adjustment on the side of the latter solves both problems in a universal (national) language of 'citizenship'. In that context of collective identity construction on the 'autochthonous' side, the memorandum contains the plans for a 'Charter of Responsible Citizenship', notes that the 'Dutch Canon' has been presented and takes the initiative to open a 'Museum of National History' (VROM 2007: 98). Meanwhile, similar discursive divisions become visible at the local level of citizenship policies.

The 'Regionalization' of Citizenship: The Virtual Citizen on the Local Level

Citizenship has been reported as 'disaggregated' (Benhabib 2004). This fragmentation of aspects of citizenship now located at different levels of executive agency is accompanied by a 'regionalization' of citizenship which locates citizenship at different levels along a local/global axis. The state discourse on 'integration as citizenship' not only takes place on the national level analysed above, but also on the local level of cities and municipalities which construct their own notions of the 'active citizen'. The local dimension of citizenship is increasingly thematized (cf. Duyvendak and Uitermark 2006; Hortulanus and Machielse

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2002; Modood et al. 2006; Schinkel 2007b; Uitermark and Duyvendak 2008; Uitermark et al. 2005). A focus on the local level is specifically crucial first of all since citizenship is multi-layered (cf. Balibar 2004; Yuval-Davis 1999); secondly since the diminishing importance of the state in times of globalization propels the urban arena into a site of contested citizenship (Schinkel 2009; Uitermark and Van Steenbergen 2006). A *regionalization of citizenship* can be said to take place alongside the moralization of citizenship that takes place when it becomes the central focus of a culturist discourse on integration (Schinkel 2007a: 395–6).

On the one hand, the idea of local citizenship is regressive in the sense that citizenship was once a local affair. 'Citizens' or '*citoyens*' lived in the 'city' or the '*cité*'; 'burghers' (*bourgeois*) lived in the 'burght' (*bourg*) (see Prak 1997; Stevin 2001 [1590]). The '*droit de cité*' provided protection from the feudal sovereign, and citizens were hence restricted to the city. When the political unit extended beyond the city, citizenship became national. That did not abolish local aspects of citizenship, i.e. rights and duties aggregated on a local level, but it did prioritize national citizenship. The regionalization of citizenship can be said to occur in part as a consequence of the problematization of national citizenship, which gives salience to the local level as a way of gaining hold of the population through citizenship when the dominant conception thereof is weakened in the process of globalization. The regionalization of citizenship thus fits Roland Robertson's idea of 'glocalization' which signals the renewed relevance of the local in times of globalization (Robertson 1995). In that sense, it is the consequence of a shift in the spatial focus of integration policies. Generally, that shift is one from the national level to the level of the city, from the city to the city quarter, and from there to the street (cf. Van Putten 2006). Compatible with the fluidity of local/national levels characteristic of governance (cf. Rhodes 1997), an ever tighter zooming in on 'the problems' has taken shape in policies of integration, and the focus on citizenship has meant an increasingly regionalized focus on local forms of citizenship. As Godfried Engbersen, a prominent Dutch sociologist and chairman of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences committee on the Future of Dutch Sociology has remarked: politics emphasizes 'the importance of the old integration frameworks of village, neighbourhood and family.' Referring to Ulrich Beck, he dubs such politics as 'zombie politics', using obsolete notions to describe a changed social reality (Engbersen and De Haan 2006: 1). Nonetheless, the regionalization and localization of citizenship constitutes a form of 'glocalization' that can be interpreted in light of the problematization of national citizenship as a consequence of globalization (Jacobson 1996; Sassen 2006). Yet it takes shape in a defensive mode in which the local is pitted against the global.

'Active Citizens' in The Hague

While it is the seat of the Dutch national government, The Hague is very segregated along 'autochthon/allochthon' lines and quite silently so. It is hardly ever in the news for its policies. It is therefore interesting to see to what extent The Hague's citizenship policy also discursively articulates a virtualization of citizenship. To that end, I discuss the city's

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most recent policy paper on citizenship, as well as the website on which it can be found (the two sources contain different content attributed to citizenship). In line with the shift in national policy since 1994 described above, the city of The Hague finds that

> in the past few years the term 'integration' has had a negative press. On hearing the word integration many people think of the new inhabitants of the city of The Hague who should adapt themselves to the existing and established society. The term citizenship however makes everything equal. This … paints a better picture because after all we are all citizens. (The Hague City Council 2008)

And it adds what it means by 'we are all citizens': 'we all want a clean, beautiful and safe city to live in' (The Hague City Council 2008). Next, however, citizenship is reformulated from a shared form of *being* ('we are all citizens') to a shared *task*: 'we have opinions that we want to express. We all want a city where we can have a good working and home life. Therefore the task of citizenship is for everyone.' (The Hague City Council 2008) The idea of citizenship as a task marks a transition from citizenship as actuality to citizenship as virtuality, a moral virtue that is not necessarily present but may remain a possibility, a potential (un)realized. Hence the question posed in the (most recent) Policy Memorandum on Citizenship *Being the City Together: Citizens Make the Difference*: 'Citizen: something you are or something you become?' (The Hague City Council 2006: 7). The municipal government sees its role as follows: it 'wants to stimulate our citizens to take responsibility for the quality of housing and community life in our city' (The Hague City Council 2008). It furthermore becomes evident that citizenship – stated here as 'good citizenship' – means that: you are 'owner of his [the citizen's] street', 'you receive education, you work or you contribute in other ways to the city. For example, by raising your children to the best of your ability, by volunteering for activities in society or by following a social training scheme.' (The Hague City Council 2008) 'Good citizenship' also means 'giving shape and colour to The Hague together'. In the 2006 memorandum (which the 'What Is Citizenship?' text on the website accompanies), yet another definition of citizenship can be found:

> There are many definitions of citizenship. We keep it simple. For us, citizenship means that people feel involved: their effort to contribute by themselves to the improvement of the social climate and also to take responsibility for their social environment, that is what we call citizenship. A citizen feels co-owner of his [sic] street and his neighbourhood. The school of his children is his school, the tree in front of his house is his tree. The public space is the living room of the city where one meets one another. Where one seeks support from each other and where one shares experiences with one another. A citizen realizes that social quality is not a right nor a present, but something one must make, anew everyday, with each other. (The Hague City Council 2008: 7).

This way, social rights which are part of Dutch formal citizenship (cf. Fraser and Gordon 1998; Marshall 1963) are relocated under moral citizenship. Moreover, the public space is

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modelled after private space (the 'living room'), which legitimates a paternalist discourse that seeks to turn the private into a public affair and thematizes the proper 'raising of children' as 'citizenship'. The definition of 'good citizenship' thereby effortlessly crosses public/private boundaries. Persons who are not 'good citizens' in the public living room surely cannot be good citizens in the private living room. What is more: the problems in the private living room are the cause of the problems in the public living room. That is why, in the Dutch version of 'new paternalism', the idea is that 'real problems are behind the front door' (Tokmetzis 2007: 3) or, alternatively, in the mother's womb (see the Dutch literature on 'behind the front door policies': Cornelissen and Brandsen 2007; De Meere and Davelaar 2005; on 'moralizing policies': Uitermark et al. 2006). Current local citizenship policies in Dutch cities are closely tied to new paternalist policy discourses and practices, and the problematization of 'raising children', which is of recent date in Dutch policies (since the 1970s) is to be seen in this light (cf. Uitermark et al. 2006). Citizenship becomes a form of civility (Van Huis and De Regt 2005). This makes the private 'living room' a public affair. Moreover, the 'own responsibility' of citizens is thematized in conformity with neoliberal notions of 'responsibility' (Ossewaarde 2006; Uitermark et al. 2006; Wacquant 2006). It is then the local government that states, as in the subtitle of the 2006 memorandum: 'citizens make the difference.' The difference between formal and moral citizenship is clearly present here:

> Being a citizen is a right. Whoever is active does not gain extra rights, whoever keeps aloof forfeits none. But, next to a juridical concept, citizenship is also an attitude towards life. In this memorandum we are not speaking of citizens in the sense of carriers of citizen's rights, but of citizenship as a way of life, of giving meaning to one's own existence by taking social responsibility. (The Hague City Council 2006: 7)

To this quasi-existential and culturalized notion of citizenship, consequences are attached in case of failure to live up to 'citizenship as an attitude towards life'. The associations made concern 'anti-citizenship', 'rudeness' and 'anti-social behaviour', in which cases 'non-willing' persons are concerned (The Hague City Council 2006: 8). Society is a 'society of the willing' and as in Rousseau's *volonté générale* the 'non-willing' falls outside the contractual community. The citizen that 'keeps aloof' is citizen in the formal sense but remains 'anti-social', non-participating and outside 'society' which is shaped in part in and through this discourse on 'citizenship'.

Conclusion: The Virtualization of Citizenship and the New Position of the State

In his influential *The Politics of Recognition*, Charles Taylor states that it is crucial not to create a difference between 'first-class' citizens and 'second-class' citizens (Taylor 1994: 37). The virtualization of citizenship achieves just that, by distinguishing 'citizens' from 'non-integrated' persons that are discursively exorcized from society. In the case of Dutch policy, the relative rift between formal and moral citizenship leads to the discursive

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articulation of certain citizens – immigrants who are citizens in the formal sense – as quasi-subjects, at once protected and feared within the nation-state. The very emphasis on moral citizenship in a state-initiated policy *discourse* indicates a shift in the state's orientation. In general, the state slowly moves away from social welfare and direct interference with economic life towards new forms of control, surveillance and monitoring (cf. Bauman 2009; Noordegraaf and Noordegraaf-Eelens 2009; Sassen 2009; Wacquant 2009). Citizenship is one venue at which the state finds a new functional potential in times of globalization. The moralization and ensuing virtualization of citizenship concerns not the formal inclusion in the nation-state, but the moral inclusion in the discursive domain of 'society'. The end of the post-war Marshallian citizenship regime in which nation and society matched in a relatively unproblematic way was brought about by late 20th century immigration (Jacobson 1996). In the ensuing Dutch conflation of 'immigrant integration' with 'citizenship', the role of the state has shifted from controlling the borders of the nation-state to *controlling the borders of 'society'*. A more diffuse and especially discursive process has thereby been initiated. For while inclusion in and exclusion from the nation-state is a juridical matter, inclusion in and exclusion from 'society' is a discursive matter that cannot be legally codified (Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Schinkel 2007a). The first is foremost a matter of formal citizenship; the second of moral citizenship. Moral citizenship can of course – with a time lag – be legally codified (cf. Vermeulen 2007) (and formal citizenship can be analysed for moral aspects), but that does not mean that inclusion in and exclusion from 'society' can be codified. And through the image of the 'active citizen', the image of 'society', of what society is and who belongs to it, looms large. In Dutch discourse on integration, lack of integration concerns persons 'outside society' (Schinkel 2007a).

The shift in focus of the state has to do with the destabilization of the modern state/society differentiation. The state, which implicitly regulated the in- and exclusion of society by regulating the in- and exclusion of the nation under conditions of relative homology or overlap between society and the nation now has to operate on two fronts. It needs to regulate the in- and exclusion of the nation-state mostly by means of formal citizenship. But given the effects of migration (awareness of which in the Netherlands came midway through the 1970s), it is now also relevant for the state to formulate the substance of moral citizenship as adherence to a 'dominant culture'. In the control over what 'society' consists of by means of the manipulation of moral citizenship, the state finds new tasks in an age when its previous position has become problematic (cf. Bauman 2002; Beck 2002; Mann 1997; Robinson 1998; Sassen 2006; Schinkel 2009). The state thereby gains a power of articulation in what 'society' is, as it becomes a key force behind the predominant self-observation (cf. Luhmann 1984, 1997) of society. But it can only do so at the cost of differentiating the good and active citizens from the not so good and 'inactive' citizens. This has the effect of a virtualization of citizenship in which the formal aspects of citizenship are downplayed relative to the moral aspects, which are found lacking especially in immigrants and their descendants – the ones disturbing the perfect match between nation and society.

To conclude, I would like to hint at the 'motivation' behind the virtualization of citizenship. Perhaps it is better to speak of 'function' here, though I take that concept in the loose sense of the contingent relation between certain problems for social systems such as the state and

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certain solutions. In what sense can the virtualization of citizenship be seen as functionally productive for the state? Most generally, it is one way in which the state gains a new terrain of control over citizens and society. The state-led moral discourse on citizenship signals a renewed effort by the state to control the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of society. In the Netherlands, as in various other western European countries, a neo-nationalism exists that attempts to define the cultural roots of societies increasingly perceived to be under the spell of 'globalization'. Globalization not only hollows out the national unity underlying the nation-state, it also weakens individual states. By means of a renewed focus on citizenship, states attempt to regain territory and shift efforts, specifically from social benefits as part of a welfare state, to the field of culture. A cultural form of specifically anti-transnational loyalty is thus deemed to define what the good citizen is. This shift in controllable terrain by the state from the material to the cultural is hence accompanied by a shift in notions of citizenship. The citizen is now less the rights-bearing worker than the individual burdened with the duty of cultural allegiance and national loyalty. A shifting state produces new subjects to the state. If the terrain of state control is shifted towards the cultural, then it is the production of specific cultural subjects that takes precedence.

Notes

1 The word 'burger' stems from *burgher*, which means an inhabitant of a *burcht* (a fortified settlement) (see, for a 16th century use of the word, Stevin 2001 [1590]; cf. Prak 1997). The German 'Bürger' and the Kantian/Hegelian notion of the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* has similar origins, much like 'citizen' and '*citoyen*' are derived from 'city' and '*cité*'.

2 See also the website of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Development and the Environment, (consulted 4 December 2009): http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=2706&sp=2&dn=w1009

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